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VOTING RIGHTS ROLLBACK:
THE EFFECT OF BUCKHANNON ON THE PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS
BRIAN J. SUTHERLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
The effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act'-the law that Dr. Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., saw the passage of as "a shining moment in the
conscience of man" 2-is in serious jeopardy. There has been a dra-
matic rollback in all areas of civil rights enforcement by the United
States Department of Justice during the Bush administration, 3 but the
Department's record with respect to voting rights enforcement has
been especially contentious.4 Beyond the allegations of politicization,
both in general' and with respect to the Section 56 preclearance pro-
* Staff Attorney, ACLU Southern Regional Office and Voting Rights Project, Atlanta,
Georgia. J.D. summa cum laude, Seattle University School of Law, 2006. B.A. cum laude, Uni-
versity of Washington, 2003. The author sincerely thanks his colleagues at the Voting Rights
Project for their valuable insights and assistance.
1. Elective Franchise Enforcement of Voting Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
2. NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.,
AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 324 (Houghton Mifflin 2005).
3. See generally, The Dep't of Pub. Policy of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights
Educ. Fund,The Bush Administration Takes Aim: Civil Rights Under Attack, http://www.civil
rights.org/publications/reports/taking-aiml (last visited Aug. 20, 2007); WILLIAM L. TAYLOR ET
AL., The Erosion of Rights: Declining Civil Rights Enforcement Under the Bush Administration,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/03/pdf/civil-rights-report.pdf (last visited Aug. 20,
2007).
4. See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 32; Joseph D. Rich, Op-Ed., Bush's Long History of
Tilting Justice, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2007.
5. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty and Massimo Calabresi, Inside the Scandal at Justice, TIME
MAGAZINE, May 21, 2007, at 44. The tumult over politicization at the Department of Justice
appears to have contributed substantially to the resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gon-
zales and seriously damaged the DOJ's reputation. See, e.g., Donna Leinwand, Gonzales' Suc-
cessor to Inherit a Fractured Agency: High Vacancies, Low Morale Cited at Justice, USA TODAY,
Aug. 29, 2007, at 6A.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c). Section 5 provides that whenever certain covered jurisdictions "en-
act or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect" on the date that cover-
age began, the jurisdiction must first secure preclearance for that voting change. Id.
Preclearance requires either a submission of the change to the United States Attorney General
or the bringing of a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the
District Columbia, with a resultant determination by either that the proposed changes do not
have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on ac-
count of race or color, or membership in a language minority group. Id.
1
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cess,7 one public interest organization has noted that the enforcement
of minority voting rights under Section 28 of the Act has come to "a
virtual standstill." 9 During the Bush administration, the Department
has brought fewer Section 2 cases and has brought them at a lower
rate than any other administration since 1982.10 This lack of enforce-
ment has been at the expense of African-Americans and American
Indians in particular.11
The government's failure to adequately enforce the Voting Rights
Act and other voting rights protections in general renders private en-
forcement by individuals imperative. Congress itself has been acutely
aware of this reality for decades, recognizing the "sound policy" of
authorizing private enforcement because "Congress depends heavily
upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved."'"
During the hearings on the latest reauthorization of the Voting Rights
Act, 13 the House Committee on the Judiciary recognized again that
private enforcement is crucial to safeguarding minority voting rights. 4
With respect to Section 5, for example, the Committee observed that
"the Department of Justice has no 'systematic way to monitor all such
jurisdictions to ensure that all changes are submitted for
preclearance."' 15 For this reason, "much of the burden of enforcing
Section 5 over the years has fallen to private citizens whose assistance
7. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 36-38; Dan Eggen, Gonzalez Defends Approval of Texas Re-
districting by Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2005 (reporting on allegations of politicization stem-
ming from a decision by the leadership of the Justice Department to overrule the
recommendation of career staff personnel that redistricting in Texas not be precleared under
Section 5); Dan Eggen, Justice Dep't Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2005 (reporting on a change in practice at the Department of Justice preventing staff
attorneys from making recommendations regarding preclearance of voting changes).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). (prohibits states and political subdivisions from imposing voting
qualifications or prerequisites to voting, or standards, practices, or procedures in a manner that
results in denial or abridgment of the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or membership in a
language minority group). A violation is established if, "based on the totality of circumstances,
it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice."
Id. at (b). See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S. Ct. 2752 (1986).
9. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 40.
10. TAYLOR, supra note 3, at 40.
11. See id. at 40-42 ("whereas eight of the 22 Section 2 cases filed in the last six years of the
Clinton administration were on behalf of African American citizens, and six were on behalf of
American Indians, only two Section 2 cases of any type have been filed by this administration on
behalf of African American citizens and none has been filed on behalf of American Indian citi-
zens."). Id.
12. S. REP. No. 94-295, at 40 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 807.
13. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. Law 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
14. H.R. REP. 109-478, at 41-42 (citing Protecting Minority Voters: The Voting Rights Act
at Work 1982-2005 (The Nat'l Comm'n on the Voting Rights Act Feb. 2006)).
15. Id. at 41.
2
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has been critical to ensuring that discriminatory changes are stopped
before they negatively affect minority voters. "16
Private enforcement of voting rights is nearly impossible, though,
unless attorney's fees can be awarded to successful plaintiffs;17often,
"the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money
with which to hire a lawyer."18 Where there is no monetary recovery
from which lawyers may earn a portion on contingency, there must be
"fees which are adequate to attract competent counsel."19 However,
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources20 severely restricted the award of statutory attor-
ney's fees and caused a great deal of lamentation throughout the
world of public interest litigation.2'
This article contextualizes the crisis created by Buckhannon with
reference to voting rights specifically. Part II briefly summarizes the
background on attorney's fees and the sea of change that Buckhannon
brought about. Part III then builds on other valuable commentary to
explain how voting rights cases, like other kinds of public interest liti-
gation, are by their nature uniquely susceptible to Buckhannon. Next,
Part IV illustrates these features by reference to some of the extant
case law in order to concretely identify the obstacles to voting rights
enforcement created by Buckhannon. Finally, Part V offers additional
remarks on how Buckhannon poses a threat to voting rights and urges
a congressional solution in order to avoid evisceration of the funda-
mental protections of the Voting Rights Act and other civil rights
laws.22
II. STATUTORY ATITORNEY'S FEES AND BUCKHANNON'S
CRUSHING BLOW
The award of attorney's fees to a successful litigant is itself a depar-
ture from the general "American Rule" that litigants must bear their
16. Id. at 42 (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807 ("[F]ee awards are a necessary means of enabling
private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights.").
18. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5910.
19. Id. at 5913.
20. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598 (2001).
21. See Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in Envi-
ronmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2-3, n.9
(setting forth dozens of articles dealing with various substantive contexts, the titles of which
demonstrate "the range of fields in which Buckhannon triggered alarm").
22. See also Silecchia, at 77, n.n. 426-27 (citing and discussing scholarship in support of
legislative responses to Buckhannon).
20081
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own costs of court.23 However, although this general rule has endured
for most purposes in American courts since the earliest days of the
Republic, 24 several judicial exceptions were developed2 5 by courts ex-
ercising their equitable powers to achieve justice in certain types of
cases.26  One such exception-the "private attorney general doc-
trine"-developed in the context of citizen suits to enforce civil rights
laws,27 and provided a basis upon which to award fees to private par-
ties who enforced congressional policies of the utmost importance on
their own behalf as well as on behalf of the public interest. 28 The
award of reasonable attorney's fees in such cases was sound policy
because "[i]f successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their
own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to
advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the
federal courts. 29
However, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,3°
the Supreme Court invalidated the private attorney general doctrine
as such, and severely restricted the authority of courts to fashion bases
upon which to award fees. 1 In Alyeska, an environmental group
23. See generally Robin Stanley, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources: To the Prevailing Party Goes the Spoils... And the
Attorney's Fees!, 36 AKRON L. REV. 363, 365-67 (2003). The American Rule is contrasted with
the English, or "loser pays," which is not actually as simple as it sounds but rather involves a
somewhat complex institutional framework that has grown up around the need to spread the
financial obligations of litigation imposed by the English Rule. See id. David A. Root, Attorney
Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule" and "En-
glish Rule," 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 583, 606-07 (2004).
24. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975) (citing
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 306 (1796), in which the Supreme Court "appears to have
ruled that the Judiciary itself would not create a general rule, independent of any statute, al-
lowing awards of attorneys' fees in federal courts," and describing early legislative exceptions to
the rule).
25. See id. at 275 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (identifying the assessment of attorney's fees for
willful violation of a court order, for bad faith or oppressive litigation practices, and where the
successful litigants have created a common fund for recovery or extended a substantial benefit to
a class); Stanley, supra note 23, at n.26 and accompanying text (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 241,
247, 257-59); Root, supra note 23, at 585-87 (identifying six categories of exceptions to the Amer-
ican Rule).
26. Id. at 274 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A]llowance of such costs in appropriate situations
is part of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts") (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939)).
27. See, e.g., Armand Derfner, Background and Origin of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee
Awards Act of 1976, 37 URB. LAw. 653-55 (2005).
28. See, e.g., Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1974) (citing Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968)).
29. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. at 402 (1968).
30. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
31. Id. at 263 ("[C]ongressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept can in no
sense be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the traditional rule against
nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and to award attorneys' fees whenever the courts
deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant the
award."). Id.
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brought suit against the Secretary of the Interior, alleging that he was
set to issue permits for the construction of an oil pipeline in Alaska in
violation of the National Environmental Protection Act and the Min-
eral Leasing Act.32 In the ensuing litigation, the State of Alaska and
the company that planned to build the pipeline intervened, and in-
junctive relief against them was eventually obtained.33 Congress then
acted to amend the Mineral Leasing Act in order to allow the con-
struction,34 and the lower court awarded fees to the plaintiffs under
the private attorney general doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed
and dispensed with any "roving authority"36 for courts to award fees
without congressional guidance. Proceeding from the history of the
American Rule and various specific grants of statutory authority to
award fees in certain types of cases,37 the Court concluded that "under
this scheme of things, it is apparent that the circumstances under
which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of
the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to
determine."38
Congress responded to Alyeska by enacting the Civil Rights Attor-
ney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (CRAFFA).39 Designed to remedy the
"anomalous gaps" in the civil rights laws created by Alyeska,4 ° the
CRAFFA provided authority for courts to award reasonable attor-
ney's fees4 1 to "prevailing parties ' 42 in suits brought to enforce certain
32. Id. at 242-43 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185, 82 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (NEPA)).
33. Id. at 243-44.
34. Id. at 244-45.
35. Id. at 245-46.
36. Id. at 260.
37. Id. at 247-261.
38. Id. at 261.
39. Pub. Law. No. 94-559, 90 Stat 2641, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
40. 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5911.
41. The determination of what is a "reasonable attorney's fee" was derived from the section
of the MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, R. 2-106, now MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RE-
SPONSIBILITY R. 1.5 (2007). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (1983):
The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of
employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the
circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974), cited in S.
REP. No. 94-1011, at 4 (1976) as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5013.
42. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976) as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908-09. However,
because parties bringing suit to vindicate fundamental rights "should not be deterred from bring-
ing good faith actions" to do so, "such a party, if unsuccessful, could be assessed his opponent's
fee only where it is shown that his suit was clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harass-
ment purposes." Id. at 5912. This rule, known as "one-way fee shifting," is utilized in various
fee-shifting statutes and is controversial in some contexts, for though it generally confers the
benefits of added monitoring, deterrence and increased compensation, it may also risk over-
2008]
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civil rights acts. Thus, the CRAFFA ensured that these protections
would not become "mere hollow pronouncements,"43 but instead
would continue to have efficacy through private enforcement. The
"prevailing party" language of the CRAFFA was the same as that in-
cluded in many other important public justice mandates, including the
Voting Rights Act," and has been included in many others since.4 5
Though some narrowing interpretations of the term "prevailing party"
began to develop later,46 courts generally adhered to the purpose and
spirit of the provisions, which provided that parties should be consid-
ered "prevailing" when they "vindicate important rights," sometimes
"without formally obtaining relief. '47 The most important example of
deterrence and be inefficient at times. See generally Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee-
Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039 (1993).
43. Id. at 5913.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (West Supp. 2007) (providing for reasonable attorney's fees awards
to prevailing parties in suits to enforce the fifth and fifteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution). In fact, the CRAFFA grew out of hearings and testimony taken in 1973 and
incorporated into an amendment that was passed as part of the Extension and Amendments of
the Voting Rights Act in 1975. S. REP. 94-1011, at 2, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909. "Because of
the time pressure to pass the Voting Rights Amendments, the Senate took action on the House-
passed version of the legislation. S. 1279 was not taken up on the Senate floor." Id. Indeed, the
identity of § 19731 and § 1988 are evidenced by the almost completely identical provisions in the
Senate Reports accompanying them. Compare S. REP. No. 94-1011 (1976) as reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908 with S. REP. No. 94-295 (1975) as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774.
45. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (stating that there are over 150
federal fee-shifting statutes). See also Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (listing over 100 such statutes in an appendix). See generally J. Douglas Klein, Does
Buckhannon Apply? An Analysis of Judicial Application and Extension of the Supreme Court
Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond, 13 DUKE ENV-rL. L. & POL'Y F. 99, 105-08 (2002)
(noting, for example, that fees are awarded under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d)(2) (2000), if the plaintiff "finally prevails," and under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7607(f) (2000), "whenever [the court] determines that such an award is appropriate")). Many
fee-shifting provisions include the phrase "prevailing party," but other formulations of what it
means to be a successful litigant entitled to attorney's fess have been employed as well. See
generally id. The differing language has allowed different conclusions as to whether Buckhan-
non applies to fee awards under certain statutes, though of course that argument is difficult to
make with respect to the fee provision applicable to the Voting Rights Act because of its prove-
nance. See id. See also supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (holding that civil rights plain-
tiffs who successfully appealed a directed verdict for defendants and won several discovery mo-
tions were not "prevailing parties" because they did not prevail on the merits of any of their
claims); Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 203-04 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff is not a "prevailing
party" for purposes of § 1988, even if she or he obtains a declaratory judgment, if it does not
affect the behavior of the defendant toward the plaintiff). See also Catherine R. Albiston &
Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhan-
non for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1096-98 (2007) ("Since Alyeska, a
second, more subtle erosion of fee-shifting provisions has come from the courts under the guise
of promoting settlement), (citing and discussing Chesney, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), and Evans v. Jeff D.,
475 U.S. 717 (1986)).
47. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 1 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912 (emphasis
added); S. REP. No. 94-295, at 41 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 808 "In appro-
priate circumstances, counsel fees under sections 402 and 403 may be awarded pendente lite."
(citation omitted). Id. Such awards are especially appropriate where a party has prevailed on an
6
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such adherence to this principle was the "catalyst theory," whereby a
plaintiff could be awarded attorney's fees without obtaining a judg-
ment, so long as she achieved the desired result of the suit by bringing
about a voluntary change in the defendant's behavior.4" The theory
recognized a plaintiff's success if she proved that she had obtained
"some of the benefit sought" in the litigation, that the claim was color-
able and not frivolous, and that the lawsuit was a substantial or signifi-
cant cause of the defendant's change in conduct.4 9 Thus, by acting as
the "catalyst" for the defendant's change and prompting compliance
with important public policies, the plaintiff became a "prevailing
party" entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.5°
Then came Buckhannon. The case involved a company that oper-
ated nursing homes and assisted living facilities in West Virginia.51
Several such facilities failed fire inspections because state law prohib-
ited them from housing persons who could not escape without assis-
tance in the event of a fire.52 After the State sent letters ordering the
facilities to close, the company, one of the residents, and an organiza-
tion brought suit against the State Department of Health and Human
Services, alleging that the state law requirements violated the Fair
Housing Amendments Act (FHAA)53 and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA). 54 While the litigation was pending, the West Vir-
ginia Legislature passed bills that amended the state law and
effectively mooted the controversy, and the defendant obtained a dis-
missal on that basis.55 Reasoning that it had been a catalyst for en-
forcing West Virginia's compliance with federal law,5 6 the plaintiffs
then sought attorney's fees under the FHAA and ADA.57 However,
important matter in the course of litigation, even when he ultimately does not prevail on all
issues (citation omitted). Id. Moreover, for purposes of the award of counsel fees, parties may be
considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights through a consent judgment or without
formally obtaining relief (emphasis added) Id.).
48. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 601 (2001).
49. See, e.g., Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing circuit court
opinions for the rules). See also id. at 610 (Rehnquist, J.) (stating the catalyst theory as requiring
the inquiries of "whether the claim was colorable rather than groundless; whether the lawsui[t]
was a substantial rather than an insubstantial cause of the defendant's change in conduct;
whether the defendant's change in conduct was motivated by the plaintiff's threat of victory
rather than the threat of expense.").
50. Id. at 628 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J.).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 601 (citing Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 3601)).
54. Id. (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12101)).
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at 601-02.
2008]
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the Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the catalyst theory as a
permissible basis for the award of attorney's fees under the Acts58
and, in doing so, dramatically altered the landscape of private civil
rights enforcement and public interest litigation.
Instead, the Buckhannon Court held that to be a prevailing party, a
litigant must be awarded some relief on the merits by a court. 59 This
could be a favorable judgment, or even a settlement enforced through
a consent decree, so long as it is a "court-ordered change in the legal
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant" 6°-a "material
change"6 1 in that relationship that bears sufficient "judicial imprima-
tur."62 The Court rejected the argument that without the catalyst the-
ory, nothing would prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting
litigation to avoid a judgment and fee award.6 3 Instead, the catalyst
theory itself, if retained, might deter legal conduct,6 4 and in any event,
the fear of "mischievous defendants" who would moot litigation to
avoid fees "would only materialize in claims for equitable relief," be-
cause as long as there is a claim for damages, voluntary changes will
not moot a case. 65 "Even then," the Court stated:
[I]t is not clear how often courts will find a case mooted [since] '[i]t is
well-settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the
legality of that practice,' unless it is 'absolutely clear that the aliegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.
After Buckhannon, commentators immediately echoed Justice
Ginsburg's dissent,67 observing that the majority's holding contra-
dicted the congressional intent underlying fee-shifting statutes68 and
that the new rule had the potential to severely curtail the private en-
forcement of important public policies.69 Yet, in the years since the
58. Id. at 605.
59. Id. at 601-02.
60. Id. at 604 (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
792 (1989)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 605.
63. Id. at 608.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 608-09.
66. Id. at 609 (citing Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc. 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000)).
67. See id. at 622-43.
68. See, e.g., Leading Case, 115 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (2001); Stanley, supra note 23, at
392-93.
69. See, e.g., Aimee McFerren, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of
Health & Human Resources: The Supreme Court's Latest Assault on Prevailing Plaintiffs Elimi-
nates the Catalyst Theory of Fee-Shifting, 41 BRANDEiS L.J. 155, 173-76 (2002). Kyle A. Loring,
The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court-Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 973, 999-1008 (2002).
8
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Court's decision, additional commentary 70 and empirical evidence 71
have begun to emerge, demonstrating conclusively that these initial
fears were well-founded.72 One recent contribution in particular 73 has
called into question the empirical assumptions made by the Buckhan-
non majority74 and has identified several structural features of public
interest litigation that place it at the mercy of Buckhannon's brutal
bright-line rule.75
Buckhannon comes down hardest on enforcement actions and com-
plex impact litigation against government actors. While these cases
may vindicate the rights of many people by reforming governmental
policies and practices and thereby producing benefits distributed
broadly throughout society, the costs often outweigh the potential
gain for any single individual.76 Likewise, these cases are brought
against the government to change policies or procedures that will real-
istically only be addressed by private plaintiffs or government actors
themselves, who for various reasons fail to engage in adequate en-
forcement activity.77 Finally, recurring legal issues in these kinds of
70. See id. at notes 8 and 9 (citing several dozen articles).
71. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil
Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1087, 1116-34 (2007). The authors conducted a national survey of 221 public interest orga-
nizations in 2004, inquiring into their mission, budget, structure, goals, and activities with the aim
of assessing whether the organization was negatively affected by Buckhannon. See id. at 1116-
1118.
72. See id. at 1120-21. On the basis of both qualitative and quantitative analyses, the au-
thors report as their central findings that (1) "organizations that engage in litigation directed at
systemic social change are more likely than others to report that they were negatively affected by
the Buckhannon decision," and (2) "qualitative data [... ] indicate[s] that Buckhannon affects
far more than fee recovery." Id.
73. See generally id.
74. Id. at 1103 (identifying the two empirical assumptions made by the Buckhannon major-
ity as (1) that "last-minute changes of position by defendants to avoid fees are unlikely to be
much of a problem," and (2) that doing away with the catalyst theory will not deter plaintiffs
from bringing enforcement actions).
75. Id. at 1104, 1111.
76. Id. at 1095 (citing Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee
Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 237-39). See also
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 445 n.5; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Fee
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (1982) (if there were no fee-shifting, "the
cost to any private party of conducting the litigation may well exceed any gains he can expect,
even though the total gain to all beneficiaries may greatly exceed the costs. .. potential plaintiffs
may well refrain from bringing socially beneficial suits because the gains would not sufficiently
further their private interests). See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Fee Shifting:
A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 662 (1982) (setting forth several specific rationales for
fee-shifting).
77. Albiston & Nielson, supra note 71 at 1104, 1089-90 n.14 (noting that private parties
bring more than 90% of suits under civil rights and environmental protection statutes). See, e.g.,
Michael Selmi, Public v. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employ-
ment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1405 (1998) (demonstrating with empirical analysis that the gov-
ernment tends to focus on smaller, individual civil rights cases rather than cutting-edge issues,
lacks clear enforcement priorities, and succumbs to political pressure, and suggesting that "the
9
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cases play right into defendants' hands under Buckhannon and allow
them to unilaterally moot the litigation to avoid fees-what one set of
scholars calls "strategic capitulation. '78  All of this seriously under-
mines the system of private enforcement of various public justice con-
texts,79 and private voting rights enforcement is no exception, but
rather an exemplar of just how disastrous a decision Buckhannon is. 8°
III. THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF VOTING RIGHTS
LITIGATION TO BUCKHANNON
One of the significant ways in which Buckhannon impacts voting
rights litigation stems from the thing that voting rights cases share
with other kinds of public interest cases-the usual circumstance of the
plaintiffs. Attorney's fees awards are generally necessary to facilitate
the enforcement of public interest mandates for three reasons: (1) be-
cause individual enforcement is disincentivized when its benefits are
collective,8 (2) because economic incentives are necessary to maxi-
mize the quality of private enforcement,82 and (3) because litigation of
this kind is often cost-prohibitive for those who seek to vindicate these
important rights and public policies.83 However, this is incalculably
more compelling in the voting rights context because deprivation of
the right to vote is intricately linked with socio-economic disadvantage
and discrimination.84 Accordingly, victims of voting discrimination
government is inherently a weak enforcer of civil rights, and that it may be time for it to cede its
role as a primary enforcement agency").
78. Albiston and Nielsen, supra note 71, at 1104.
79. Id. at 1091. And there is all the reason in the world to protect and enhance the system
of private enforcement, given that it "decentralizes enforcement decisions, allows disen-
franchised interests access to policymaking, . . . helps insulate enforcement from capture by
established interests[, and] is also less expensive for taxpayers because it does not place the cost
of enforcement solely upon government actors." Id. at 1090.
80. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 568-69 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
The strategy of the fee-shifting provisions is to attract competent counsel to selected federal
cases by ensuring that if they prevail, counsel will receive fees commensurable with what
they could obtain in other litigation. If federal fee-bearing litigation is less remunerative
than private litigation, then the only attorneys who will take such cases will be underem-
ployed lawyers-who likely will be less competent than the successful, busy lawyers who
would shun federal fee-bearing litigation-and public interest lawyers who, by any measure,
are insufficiently numerous to handle all the cases for which other competent attorneys
cannot be found.
Id.
83. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 76, at 663-65; Dague, 505 U.S. at 568, (citing H.R. REP. No.
94-1558, at 1 (1976) and S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976)).
84. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 69 (1986) ("[P]olitical participation by mi-
norities tends to be depressed where minority group members suffer effects of prior discrimina-
tion such as inferior education, poor employment opportunities, and low incomes."); John S.
Wills, Statistical Pools and Electoral Success in Vote-Dilution Cases, 1995 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 527,
10
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are more likely to require attorney's fees to redress their rights and
are thus impacted more by the strictures of Buckhannon.
Voting rights litigation is specifically susceptible to Buckhannon be-
cause of the kind of judicial relief that is sought and who it is sought
against. Plaintiffs in voting rights cases do not seek monetary dam-
ages, 85 but they instead seek the equitable remedies of declaratory
and prospective injunctive relief. For example, plaintiffs bringing a
Section 586 claim will seek a declaration that a given change in voting
practices or procedures is first a voting change, is second a "change
affecting voting" within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act, and is
third an injunction against the defendant's further implementation of
that change in any election unless it is first precleared. 87 Likewise, in
challenging a city council districting plan for malapportionment, a
plaintiff will seek a declaration that the plan violates the "one person
one vote" principle88 and injunctive relief preventing the further use
of that plan and ordering a new plan to be adopted.89 Because voting
rights plaintiffs seek these kinds of relief rather than damages, avoid-
ing dismissal under the doctrine of mootness90 can become an onerous
burden to obtaining a judgment on the merits and thereby establishing
"prevailing party" status. Defendants can simply change a challenged
law or comply with one they have disregarded, and the case is over,
536-37 (1995) ("Throughout history, 'institutions' of widespread socioeconomic discrimination
and voting-rights violations have acted to perpetuate each other. Indeed, both these institutions
might have died out sooner had each not provided such strong reinforcement for the other.").
85. Indeed, courts have held that the Voting Rights Act does not authorize any monetary
damages. See, e.g., Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 804-05 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
there exists no cause of action for damages under Section 5 of the Act); Windy Boy v. Big Horn
County, 647 F. Supp. 1002, 1023-24 (D. Mont. 1986) (allowing no damages in a vote dilution suit
under Section 2 of the Act because "injunctive relief is the universal remedy in Voting Rights
Act cases"); Webber v. White, 422 F. Supp. 416, 426 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1983).
87. See, e.g. NAACP DeKalb County Chapter v. Georgia, 494 F. Supp. 668, 676 (N.D. Ga.
1980).
88. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1264 (2005) ("[T]he doctrine of equal representa-
tion, a constitutional requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment [that] requires that each
person's vote count the same as any other person's, and that constituencies include approxi-
mately equal numbers of voters, so that the weight of individual votes in larger districts will not
be substantially diluted, and individuals in those districts will not be deprived of fair and effec-
tive representation.") (internal citations omitted).
89. See, e.g., Arrington v. Elections Bd., 173 F. Supp. 2d 856, 858 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
90. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997) ("[Tlhe doctrine
of standing set in a time frame: the requisite personal interest that must exist at the commence-
ment of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)." (quoting
United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980))). See also generally 13A
FED. PRAC. & PROC. JuRIs. 2d § 3533. A claim for monetary damages almost always avoids a
finding of mootness. See 13A FED. PRAC. & PROC. JuRis. 2d § 3533.3. However, plaintiffs in
voting rights do not seek damages, but rather prospective injunctive relief against continued
violations of the right to vote. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
20081
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leaving those who champion the fundamental right to vote and their
attorneys to foot the bill.
Some such suits begin to mirror the factual scenario of Buckhannon
itself:9' Plaintiffs bring suit alleging that a particular statute, ordi-
nance, or regulation is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid and seek
a declaration to that effect along with injunctive relief.92 Suits of this
kind may involve an attack on laws regulating voter qualification,93
registration,94 candidacy requirements,95 or any manner of other ef-
fects on voters or the voting process.96 Then, as in Buckhannon, the
defendants can repeal, amend, or supersede the statute, ordinance, or
regulation, thereby mooting the challenge to its predecessor. This sit-
uation demonstrates one aspect of voting rights litigation that com-
pounds the problem of strategic capitulation, and that is the additional
difficulty of avoiding mootness with the voluntary cessation exception
to that doctrine 97 when the suit is against governmental defendants-
which is almost always the case in voting rights litigation.
The voluntary cessation exception, as noted by the Court in Buck-
hannon, maintains that a "defendant's voluntary cessation of a chal-
lenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice," since "if it did, the courts
would be compelled to leave '[t]he defendant ... free to return to his
old ways."' 98 Generally, voluntary cessation of a challenged practice
does not moot a case unless "subsequent events make absolutely clear
that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected
91. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
92. See, Schweier v. Cox, 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
93. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89-91 (1965).
94. See, e.g, Schweier 340 F.3d at 1285-86.
95. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 135-37 (1972).
96. See, e.g., Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 529-31 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (granting
preliminary injunction on Fourteenth Amendment grounds barring enforcement of state statute
allowing for the presence of persons at polling places who would challenge the qualifications of
voters in predominantly African-American precincts); NAACP v. Browning, Civ. No. 4:07-cv-
402 SPM/WCS (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2007) (challenging under the Fourteenth Amendment a Flor-
ida law providing for the automatic purge of voters whose voter registration records or applica-
tions contain data that is not completely identical to data contained in error-prone government
databases).
97. In addition to a defendant's voluntary cessation, there are three other major exceptions
to the doctrine of mootness: (1) where the plaintiff would suffer collateral legal consequences if
the case were not adjudicated; (2) where the wrong complained of is capable of repetition yet
evading review; and (3) in class actions where the named party ceases to represent the class. See,
e.g., In re Burrell, 415 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2005). State courts are not bound by the jus-
ticiability limitations inherent in Article III of the Constitution, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish,
490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989), and so many have fashioned additional exceptions to the mootness
doctrine that federal courts may not recognize. See infra note 123.
98. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000),
(citing City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 (1982)).
12
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to recur," and defendants bear a heavy burden in establishing this.9 9
However, the exception generally applies with much less force to gov-
ernment defendants because courts are more likely to trust them to
honor commitments to change their conduct,100 and many lower
courts have ruled that legislative repeal of a challenged law does not
even fall within the voluntary cessation exception at all, or does so
only in exceptional circumstances. 1 ' As mentioned above, this com-
pounds the problem of strategic capitulation in voting rights cases be-
cause they are almost always brought against government defendants,
so avoiding dismissals on mootness grounds is that much more diffi-
cult. The cases set forth in the next part illustrate this and other
problems.
IV. STRATEGIC CAPITULATION IN VOTING RIGHTS CASES
A handful of cases decided after Buckhannon involve voting rights
issues and demonstrate that the strategic capitulation allowed and en-
couraged by the decision makes fee recovery more difficult and
thereby discourages the private enforcement of voting rights. One ex-
ample is Chapman v. Gooden,02 a case brought in Alabama state
court to challenge the disfranchisement of individuals convicted of
felonies. In 1996, Alabama citizens ratified an amendment to the state
constitution altering the nature of felon disfranchisement such that
only persons convicted of felonies involving moral turpitude would be
disqualified from voting.10 3 If a person had been convicted of such a
felony, he or she could apply to the Pardons and Parolees Board for a
Certificate of Eligibility to vote. 104 In 2005, questions arose regarding
the implementation of these laws, and the Attorney General of Ala-
bama issued an opinion letter explaining that persons convicted of
99. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2751 (2007)
(internal citations omitted).
100. See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. PRAC. & PROC. JURIS.
2D § 3533.7 (2d ed. 1984). In addition, "[s]pecial ambiguities arise when new officials replace
those who had pursued a challenged policy. ... Many cases suggest that the plaintiff must show
that the case is not moot because the challenged practices were not personal to the former offi-
cials." Id. (internal citations omitted). See also Albiston and Nielsen, supra note 71, at note 140
and accompanying text; Michael Ashton, Recovering Attorneys' Fees with the Voluntary Cessa-
tion Exception to Mootness Doctrine After Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 965, 983 (2002).
101. See Ashton, supra note 100, at 988-90.
102. Chapman v. Gooden, No. 1051712, 2007 WL 1576103 (Ala. June 1, 2007).
103. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 177 (amended 1996). Previously, disfranchisement
would follow from conviction of specified offenses, all felonies punishable by imprisonment, and
all "crimes of moral turpitude." ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 182 (repealed 1996).
104. ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1 (2003).
20081
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felonies not involving moral turpitude remained eligible to vote and
were therefore ineligible to apply for a Certificate of Eligibility. °5
After the Attorney General issued his opinion, the Alabama Secre-
tary of State notified every voter registrar in Alabama that she would
seek advice regarding which felonies were disfranchising felonies and
which were not, but she told them not to register anyone convicted of
any felony, regardless of whether it involved moral turpitude, if they
did not have a Certificate. 10 6 Plaintiff Richard Gooden had been con-
victed of felony driving under the influence-a felony not involving
moral turpitude under Alabama law-and tried to register to vote in
Jefferson County but he was denied because he did not have a Certifi-
cate of Eligibility. 10 7 In September of 2005, he brought suit against
the registrar and the Secretary of State for three reasons: (1) to allege
violations of the Alabama Constitution and state laws, a08 (2) to seek
declaratory relief to establish his own eligibility to vote, and (3) to
clarify the eligibility of persons convicted of felonies not involving
moral turpitude to vote without a Certificate of Eligibility.t0 9 He also
sought injunctive relief requiring the Secretary of State to notify and
advise the registrars of Jefferson County and other areas, to direct
them to register Gooden and other similarly situated individuals to
vote, and to issue a press release and other forms of notice calculated
to apprise the public of the law and the disqualifying crimes.'1
However, in November of 2005, the Attorney General of Alabama
intervened in the suit, and admitted that Gooden was improperly de-
nied registration. u  As the case progressed, 1 2 the Attorney Gen-
eral's Opinion Letter was sent to registrars throughout the state.' 13
The Secretary of State issued revised voter registration forms that ad-
ded the word "disqualifying" before the word "felony" in the question
asking about convictions.1'4 The defendants finally moved for sum-
105. Gooden, 2007 WL 1576103, at *1-2 (citing Op. Att'y Gen. 2005-092). An additional
question was posed as to which felonies involved moral turpitude under Alabama law. Id. The
Attorney General stated that though no exhaustive list exists, several judicial decisions have set
forth crimes that are felonies involving moral turpitude and crimes that are not. Id. at *3-4.
106. Id. at *2, *3 (citing Compl., 9 12, 91 17). In November of 2005, the month after the
complaint was filed, the Secretary of State conducted training meetings for the registrars, again
advising them to "'continue longstanding practice until [receipt of a] response by the attorney
general' to her May 2005 inquiry." Id. at *5.
107. Id. at *3 (citing Compl., 9 13-17).
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *5.
112. Id. at *5. Gooden filed an amended complaint in December of 2005 adding another
plaintiff and seeking to certify a class of plaintiffs as well as a class of defendants consisting of all
the voter registrars in Alabama. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
14
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mary judgment, asserting that the case was moot because plaintiffs
sought-after relief had already been provided." 5 After a series of rul-
ings," 6 the trial court rendered judgment for plaintiffs," t7 but the Su-
preme Court of Alabama reversed on jurisdictional grounds, 118
including that the claims were moot when judgment was entered." 9
In finding that the claims were moot, the Court first rejected the
argument that the voluntary cessation doctrine precluded such a find-
ing.12 0 The Court concluded that, after the Alabama Attorney Gen-
eral intervened and "brought with him the construction and
application of [state law] advocated by the plaintiffs,'' there was no
dispute that anyone would continue to be disfranchised solely for hav-
ing any kind of felony conviction, and the "posture of the case, the
identity of the parties, and the remedial action taken" established that
there existed no reasonable likelihood that the wrong would be re-
peated. 22 Likewise, the Court found the public interest exception to
mootness123 inapplicable because even though the issues were of pub-
lic importance, the situation was unlikely to recur.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court's
award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs.12 4 Relying on Buckhannon, the
115. Id.at *6.
116. Id. at *7-8. Plaintiffs had requested the certification of a plaintiff class and a defendant
class, and the trial court actually certified these but dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims
before, nevertheless, ruling on the merits of the challenges to the defendants' past practices and
the constitutionality of the state law. Id.
117. Id. The trial judge found that the defendant's past practices had violated the Plaintiffs'
due process rights under the Alabama Constitution and enjoined it, but he also went "much
further." Id. He ruled that the disfranchisement provision of the Alabama Code was unconsti-
tutionally vague because it did not catalogue and codify the felonies involving moral turpitude
for which individuals could be disqualified, and enjoined it until such time as the Legislature
passed legislation specifically identifying all such felonies. Id.
118. Id. at *10-12. The Court reversed the judgment striking down the statute for vagueness
because it determined that the issue had not been properly plead and litigated as such, and was
therefore not justiciable: "The case [did] not involve a dispute about how to distinguish between
felonies that involve moral turpitude and those that do not; instead it involve[d] the secretary of
state and [the Jefferson County registrar], acting upon direction from the secretary of state,
ignoring the distinction altogether and not attempting" to apply the law correctly. Id. at *10.
119. Id. at *12-16.
120. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
121. Gooden, 2007 WL 1576103 at *14.
122. Id.
123. Alabama law contains an exception to mootness in cases involving a "broad public in-
terest," that is applicable depending on "the public nature of the question, the desirability of an
authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers, and the likelihood that the
question will generally recur." Id. at *14 (citing Slawson v. Alabama Forestry Comm'n, 631
So.2d 953 (Ala. 1994) and 1A C.J.S. Actions § 81 (2005)). Many states have carved out this
exception to the mootness doctrine, but federal courts usually do not recognize it. See Avis K.
Poai, Hawaii's Justiciability Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REv. 537, 549 n.108 (2004); Harvard Law
Review Association, Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1672, 1693
n.92 (1970).
124. Gooden, 2007 WL 1576103 at *14.
15
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Court held that the plaintiffs did not secure an alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties with judicial imprimatur before the claims
had become moot, particularly because the trial court's judgment was
void for mootness, and therefore they were not prevailing parties enti-
tled to attorney's fees.125 Yet, the plaintiffs' filing of the suit resulted
in "[the Jefferson County registrar] undisputedly discontinu[ing] her
former practice of indiscriminately rejecting the applications of all
convicted felons," notification to every registrar in the state of the At-
torney General's opinion clarifying that only certain felonies could be
the basis of disqualification, and the promulgation of new statewide
revisions of voter registration forms indicating the same.1 26 But for
Buckhannon, the Alabama Attorney General's intervention and stra-
tegic capitulation to the plaintiffs' claims would not have prevented
them from obtaining a fee award for their attorneys. 127
Aside from cases like Gooden that exemplify the problem of strate-
gic capitulation through the abandonment of illegal practices, the typi-
cal Buckhannon scenario of the "voluntary" repeal of legislation
affects plaintiffs in voting rights cases as well. For example, in the
recent litigation of Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, numerous
plaintiffs challenged legislation in the state of Georgia requiring vot-
ers to present photographic identification at the polls. 28 In 2005,
Georgia enacted a law that required voters to present one of several
forms of government-issued identification in order to vote. 129 The
practical impact was that if a person did not already have a Georgia
driver's license or one of the other approved forms of identification, 3 °
then he or she would have to travel an appreciable distance to one of
the Department of Driver Services centers,13 1 and pay at least $20,
though an exception was available for indigent persons.132 In view of
125. Id. at *19.
126. Id. at *16, *5-6.
127. A fee application based on the catalyst theory would presumably garner such an award
because Plaintiffs achieved widespread notice and direction on the correct application of the law,
their own registration as qualified voters, and the revision of forms that would presumably pre-
vent some confusion among voters; their constitutional claims were not frivolous, and the lawsuit
was a substantial or significant cause of the defendant's change in conduct. See supra notes 47-48
and accompanying text.
128. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005); 504 F. Supp.
2d 1333 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
129. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
130. Id.
131. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1338-39. There are only fifty-six full-time customer service
centers and two part-time service centers throughout Georgia's 159 counties, and there are none
within the cities of Atlanta or Rome. Id. at 1338.
132. Id. at 1339. The 2005 enactment contained a provision allowing persons who wished to
obtain an identification card for voting purposes but could not afford one to obtain one free of
charge if she or he swore and affirmed that "(a) he or she is eligible to receive the Photo ID card
free of charge because he or she is indigent and cannot pay the fee for the Photo ID card; (b) he
16
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this, Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox wrote a memorandum to
the Governor urging careful consideration of the bill.' 33 Given that
she could not recall a single documented case of fraud relating to
voter impersonation at the polls in her six years on the job, she ex-
pressed her belief that the enactment was "(1) unnecessary, (2) cre-
ates a very significant obstacle to voting on the part of hundreds of
thousands of Georgians, including the poor, the infirm, and the elderly
who do not have drivers licenses because they are either too poor to
own a car, are unable to drive [a] car, or have no need to drive a car,
(3) very unlikely to receive preclearance under the Voting Rights
Act," and likely in violation of the Georgia and United States Consti-
tutions. 134 Nevertheless, Republican Governor Sonny Perdue signed
the bill into law, 135 and the United States Department of Justice issued
a controversial preclearance for it.' 36
Plaintiffs then brought suit alleging that the photo identification
(ID) requirement violated the Georgia Constitution, the Fourteenth
and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 37
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,138 and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965.139 Plaintiffs argued that the photo ID law violated the
Twenty-Fourth Amendment specifically because it was in the nature
of a poll tax, since voters who did not have a valid form of identifica-
or she desires a Photo ID card to vote in a primary or election in Georgia; and (c) he or she does
not have any other form of identification that is acceptable under O.C.G.A. § 21-2-417 for voter
identification purposes; (d) he or she is registered to vote in Georgia or is applying to register as
part of his or her application for a Photo ID card; and (e) he or she does not have a valid driver's
license issued by the State of Georgia." Id. (citing Decl. of Alan Watson 1 3-4, Ex. A).
133. Id. at 1333.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1335-36.
136. Id.
137. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsr..amend. XIV, § 1. "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for Presi-
dent or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."
U.S. CoNsT.amend. XXIV, § 1.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(A)-(B): "No person acting under color of law shall-(A) in
determining whether any individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election,
apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards, practices, or procedures
applied under such law or laws to other individuals within the same county, parish, or similar
political subdivision who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote; (B) deny the
right of any individual to vote in any election because of an error or omission on any record or
paper relating to any application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or
omission is not material in determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to
vote in such election[.]"
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. See supra note 8.
17
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tion would have to obtain one at a cost of at least $20.140 Although
the law contained a provision allowing the fee to be waived if a person
claimed indigence, plaintiffs argued that this was illusory and even if
effective, still placed an impermissible financial burden on the right to
vote.1 41 The trial court agreed with plaintiff's poll tax argument, con-
cluding that under all the circumstances, it placed a cost on the
franchise in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 42 The court
further rejected defendants' argument that the waiver provision for
indigents saved the requirement because it was not discretionary and
was always granted if requested, reasoning that voters may not be
aware of that policy, that the form required an individual to state he
or she was indigent even if that was not true, and that some voters
might simply be too embarrassed over their inability to afford an ID
card to complete the affidavit. 143 "In any event," the court held, the
waiver provision could not save the photo ID requirement because,
under Harman v. Forsennius,44 the waiver provision constituted a
"material requirement" imposed on voters who did not want to pay
for the card.145 Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs had a sub-
stantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits146 of this claim, as well
as some others,'147 and for that reason, enjoined the 2005 Photo ID
Act in October of 2005.148
However, in January of 2006, the Georgia legislature adopted the
2006 Photo ID Act. 149 This legislation amended the section dealing
with the required forms of identification and struck the section which
required an affidavit of indigence to obtain a photo ID without cost.150
Instead, under the 2006 Act, all a voter had to do to obtain a photo ID
was to "swear 'that he or she desires an identification card in order to
vote... and that he or she does not have any other form of identifica-
tion that is acceptable under [Georgia] Code § 21-2-417' and to 'pro-
duce evidence that he or she is registered to vote in Georgia.'"""' As
a result, defendants sought dismissal of various claims, including all
140. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
141. Id. at 1367.
142. Id. at 1369-70.
143. Id.
144. Harman v. Forsennius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (holding that Virginia violated the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment by imposing upon federal voters a material requirement, which forced them
to pay the customary poll tax as necessary for state elections or file a certificate of residence).
145. Billups, at 1326.
146. Id. at 1376.
147. Id.
148. Billups, 406 F. Supp.2d at 1377-78.
149. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1305 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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claims brought against the 2005 Act for mootness.15 2 Noting that,
"generally, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is mooted
by repeal of that statute [... unless ... ] there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the challenged statutory language will be reenacted,"'' 53 the
court accepted defendants' representations that they would not reen-
act the 2005 Act or seek to enforce it, and found all challenges to it
moot.1 54 Consequently, the court dismissed all such challenges. 155
Plaintiffs continued to pursue their claims against the 2006 Photo
ID Act and had a trial on the merits in 2007.56 In addition to remov-
ing the fee and administrative hurdle to obtaining a photo ID for vot-
ing purposes, the 2006 Act also made photo IDs available from local
county voter registrars. 57 Based on these changes and the testimony
of the plaintiffs that, though burdensome, it would be possible for
them to obtain a photo ID, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did
not suffer any palpable injury and therefore lacked standing. 58 Like-
wise, the court found that plaintiff organizations failed to establish
that they had standing to sue on behalf of their members, or that they
had standing to sue in their own right.1 59 Nevertheless, the court ana-
lyzed the merits out of an "abundance of caution"' 160 and denied plain-
tiffs' a permanent injunction against the law, concluding that the
burden on the right to vote imposed by the requirement was not sig-
nificant and in any event was rationally related to the State's interest
in preventing voter fraud.161 Though plaintiffs' various claims were
ultimately rejected, they did succeed in preventing the imposition of a
poll tax through the burdensome and costly procedures envisioned by
the 2005 Act.162 Yet, based on the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Sole v. Wyner, 163 which held that a plaintiff who obtains a preliminary
injunction but nevertheless later loses on the ultimate merits is not a
"prevailing party," defendants have opposed a fee award for the plain-
152. See Brief in Support of Defs.' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint For De-
claratory & Injunctive Relief in Part Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Common Cause/Ga. v.
Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, No. 4:05-cv-201-HLM (N.D. Ga. 2006).
153. See Coral Springs St. Sys. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004).
154. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Dated June 29, 2006, Com-
mon Cause v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, No. 4:05-cv-201-HLM (N.D. Ga. 2006) (on file with
author) at 8-9.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1342 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
157. Id. at 1344-45.
158. Id. at 1373-74.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1374.
161. Id. at 1375-82.
162. See Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1376 (2005) (order of Oct. 18,
2005 granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction).
163. Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188 (2007).
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tiffs, 164 arguing that plaintiffs achieved only "transient victories" with
earlier injunctions,165 and an award based on the poll tax victory
would be tantamount to an award based on the catalyst theory166 be-
cause that claim was eventually dismissed as moot after the Georgia
Legislature repealed the 2005 Act. 167 Although this litigation is still
pending and the court has not yet ruled on the fee request, the photo
ID case presents a stark example of the injustice that Buckhannon
creates when plaintiffs successfully enforce the Constitution and laws
but fail to meet technical requirements because of defendants' unilat-
eral actions.
Finally, strategic capitulation may occur through a defendant's deci-
sion to comply with the law in an enforcement action. The most dis-
concerting example of this is a suit under § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act,168 in which the defendant determines that the best course of ac-
tion is to submit the voting changes for preclearance by the Attorney
General. Once this has occurred, the three-judge district court con-
vened to enforce the preclearance requirement1 69 is without jurisdic-
tion to do anything more. 170 An example is Lopez v. Merced County,
California,171 in which plaintiffs brought suit against Merced County
and several political subdivisions therein for § 5 violations arising
from over 200 annexations and other boundary changes.1 72 Plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the annexations and other changes were
"voting changes" within the meaning of § 5, and an injunction prohib-
iting further implementation of the changes or any elections con-
ducted pursuant to them. 73 Plaintiffs then sought a preliminary
injunction against the certification of the results of upcoming elec-
164. Defs' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Preliminary Motion for Reasonable At-
torneys' Fees, Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1333, No. 4:05-cv-00201-HLM
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (on file with the author).
165. Id. at 8-9.
166. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
167. Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 164 at 10-12.
168. See supra note 6, at 84-85 and accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2000) requires that that any action under that section "shall be
heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section
2284 of title 28". Section 2284 is the current three judge court statute providing both the proce-
dure for convening a district court of three judges, as well as setting forth when it should occur
and what a single district judge is empowered to do before three judges are convened. See
generally Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, 17A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.3d
§ 4235 (2007).
170. The authority of a § 5 enforcement court is narrowly circumscribed. Once convened, it
"may determine only [1] whether § 5 covers a contested change, [2] whether § 5's approval re-
quirements were satisfied, and [3] if the requirements were not satisfied, what temporary rem-
edy, if any, is appropriate. See Lopez v. Monterey County, Cal., 519 U.S. 9, 23-24 (1996).
171. Lopez v. Merced County, Cal., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
172. Id. at 1074.
173. Complaint at 11-13, Lopez v. Merced County, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(No. 1:06-cv-01526-OWW-DLB).
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tions, but the court refused to grant one because of the proximity to
the election and the balance of the hardships, particularly since
"Plaintiffs' interests [were] protected because the Defendant jurisdic-
tions [had] submitted for preclearance . . . every [voting change] at
issue.' 74
Thereafter, the Department of Justice precleared the changes,
175
and Defendants filed motions to dismiss for mootness. 176 The court
granted the motions to dismiss because the purpose of the claims-to
enforce the preclearance requirement either by precipitating a sub-
mission to the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment action in
the District of Columbia 177-had been achieved.' 78  Likewise, al-
though Plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that the un-
precleared changes were in fact subject to the preclearance
requirement and the Defendants denied that they were even covered
by § 5,179 the court declined to grant such relief, concluding that "any
declaration on the question of § 5 coverage ... would not be based on
any specific facts and thus constitute an advisory opinion[.]' 180 Ac-
cordingly, although this litigation is pending and has yet to be finally
resolved, it is clear that Buckhannon presents substantial obstacles to
obtaining relief on the merits for plaintiffs in § 5 enforcement actions
where defendants' submission of outstanding voting changes effec-
tively ends the controversy.1 81 What is more, § 5 is particularly prob-
lematic because the limited purpose of these suits actually allows
defendants to moot the litigation more easily, since there is only one
thing the suit aims to achieve-submission of voting changes for
preclearance.
V. CONCLUSION
The enforcement of federal civil rights laws-and thus the ultimate
success of these fundamental protections-is dependent on the extent
to which private parties may go to court to vindicate them. This much
is clear from the barriers to enforcement by the federal government
because of funding and other issues organic to the bureaucracy of
public enforcement, 82 let alone problems like the recent politicization
174. Lopez at 1081.
175. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, Lopez v. Merced County, No.
1:06-cv-01526-OWW-DLB 2007 WL 1687021, at *2, 9 (E.D. Cal. June 8, 2007).
176. Id. at *2, T 12.
177. See supra note 6..
178. Lopez, 2007 WL 1687021, at *3.
179. Id. at *2, 1$ 7, 11.
180. Id. at *3.
181. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
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and turmoil in the enforcement agency.183 Indeed, a system of mixed
private and public enforcement is desirable for various reasons, not
the least of which is the insulation of enforcement from capture by
established interests. 18 4 To this end, Congress has often authorized
the award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties, and courts previ-
ously utilized their equitable powers to reward these individuals when
they enforced such important public policies as "private attorneys
general." '185 Yet, the Buckhannon decision stripped courts of the cata-
lyst theory as a basis for awards, reallocating the burdens of litiga-
tion1 86 and opening the door to tactics unfortunately all too successful
against litigants who seek to enforce federal law or bring about social
change rather than monetary recovery. 87
Since the decision, commentators and practitioners have identified
the perversion of incentives brought about by Buckhannon, including
the reduction of plaintiffs' leverage in settlement and the incentive for
defendants to delay until the last minute and then cease the chal-
lenged conduct to avoid judgment and fees. 88 These threats to the
private enforcement scheme are no more real or troublesome than in
the voting rights context. Government actors who fail to ensure at all
levels of government the compliance with laws regulating the elective
franchise have no incentive to do so until litigation is commenced and
then can swiftly move to provide enough of the relief sought by vic-
tims to presumably avoid the need for judicial relief that would satisfy
Buckhannon and compensate those who enforce the law. Likewise,
Buckhannon gives governments no incentive whatsoever to comply
with the preclearance requirement of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
They can enact and administer unprecleared voting changes with no
fear or any consequence, for all they have to do when sued for failure
to submit voting changes is submit them, and then only after it be-
comes likely that the changes are covered by § 5, thereby achieving
the purpose of a § 5 and rendering it moot.
However, despite the dramatic effects of Buckhannon on civil rights
and voting rights enforcement, the Court's holding that "prevailing
party" is a term of art has forced lower courts to apply it to § 1988,
and the code section allowing attorney's fees for those who enforce
voting rights as well, § 19731(e). Because these provisions are almost
identical, it is difficult to make the argument that voting rights litiga-
183. See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
184. Albiston, supra note 71.
185. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 76-80, 90 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 46, 71 and accompanying text.
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tion should be spared from Buckhannon.189 Accordingly, the only
real solution to the problem is congressional action. Though such ef-
forts have been unsuccessful so far, both in the civil rights context as
well as other contexts, the need for change remains pressing. The
Leadership Conference for Civil Rights, in partnership with the Na-
tional Campaign to Restore Civil Rights, will soon support new legis-
lation that would, among other things, restore the catalyst theory for
civil rights litigants who enforce our nation's fundamental public poli-
cies in this arena. This legislation should be supported wholeheart-
edly, and only after its passage will the congressional intent that fee-
shifting be utilized to provide incentives for and strengthen private
enforcement be restored, and the fundamental guarantees of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion be realized.
189. See supra note 44.
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